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Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Before Senate Committee on Rules
January 25, 1956

S. Con. Res. 2 -- To Establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence
Mr. Chairman, I am appearing today in behalf of S. Con, Res. 2.
I have introduced _ . legislation on three occasions which, if enacte d, would
create a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

This is my second oppor-

tunity to appear before this committee on this legislation, and I hope that the
results of this hearing will be another step forward in the establishment of
such a committee.

.3..5"
S. Con, Res. 2 is co-sponsored by • of my colleagues

in the Senate.
Because of the very nature of the Central Intelligence Agency. I
think that it is imperative that a Joint Congressional Committee be established
for the purpose of making continued studies of the activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency and problems related to the gathering of intelligence
affecting the national security.

I feel that a Joint Congressional Committee

should be authorized and that the CIA should, as a matter of law, keep that
Committee as fully and as currently informed as possible with respect to its
activities.
As you know, the President recently appointed an eight-man board
to review periodically the nation's intelligence activities .
forward, but does it go far enough?

I do not think so .

This is a step
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The announcement of this

n~w

board was released two days after

the date of this hearing was set by the Rules Committee.

I do not think

that this was a deliberate attempt to head off the establishment of a
Congressional watchdog committee on the intelligence agency.

I am sure

that this was only a matter of coincidence, but it does emphasize one thing
it extends and strengthens the Executive control over the CIA.

I do not object to the formation of this new Commission, nor do I
question the need by the Central Intelligence Agency and all other intelligence
agencies in the government for this kind of supervision.

What I am concerned

with , however, is CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National
Securi ty Council.

I believe this should be changed ,

The newly appointed board

members will have neither power nor control over CIA.

And it appears to me

that it is questionable how much this group will be permitted to learn under
the agency's broad charter.
Will this new commission be able to make available to the public
and to Congress anything they learn about CIA doing the wrong things or not
doing enough of the right things!?

This commission is responsible to the

Executive Department alone, and lacks the legal authority that Congressional
inquiry enjoys,

An executive order could conceal any report or recommenda-

tion the Board might make on the grounds that revealing such information might
in jur e the country.

The Congress would still remain in the dark.
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It is true that intelligence services of other major countries

operate without direct control of the legislatures.

This is understandable in a

totalitarian government, such as the Soviet Union.

It is even understandab l e

in a parliamentary democracy, such as Great Britain where the entire administration is a part of and is responsible to Parliament.

Our form of government,

however , is based on a system of checks and balances .

If this system gets

seriously out of balance at any point the whole system is jeopardized and the
way is opened for the growth of tyranny.
There have been a number of reports recently that all is not well
with the CIA.

The Hoover Commission reported a woeful shortage of informa -

tion about the Soviet Union and noted that the agency could stand some internal
administrative improvements.

These are the sorts of inadequacies which the

newly appointed commission certainly will note also, but Congressional
guardians might be able to compel even swifter and surer reform than an
executive committee.
Everything about CIA is secret.

CIA is freed from practically

every ordinary form of Congressional review.

Control of its expenditures is

exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other
government agencies.

Each year only a handful of Members in each house see

the appropriation figures .

There h as been no regular, methodical r eview o f

this agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few members of
selected subcommittees .

By law it can withhold even such obvious ly un -

important information as the salaries o f its top officials.
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I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain secrecy to be
effective.

And I certainly do not mean to suggest that CIA should reprint for

public consumption every item that comes across the Director's desk.

If

sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up.
Not only would the flow of information be cut off, but the lives of many would
be seriously endangered,

In addition, much of the value of the intelligence

product would be lost if it were known that we possessed it.

Secrecy for these

purposes is obviously necessary.
Howeve r , there is a profound difference between an essential degree
of secrecy to achieve a opecific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of
secrecy .

Once secrecy becomes sac r osanct, it invites abuse.

If we accept

this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake we will have no way of knowing whether
we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one .

If a new joint committee is set up as proposed inS. Con. Res. 2,
a ll bill s, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or in the House of
R epresentatives re l ating primarily to the CIA, would be referred to the Joint
Committee; and the Joint Committee would, from time to time, make whatever
reports are necessary to the Congress conce r ning its relationship with the CIA .
The enactment of this reso l ution would establish a Joint Committee,
composed of six members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the
Senate, and six Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Of the six members to be appointed
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fr om the Senate, three shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and three shall
be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee
o n Armed Services of the Senate.

The six House Members would be appointed

from the corresponding Subcommittees in the House .

In each instance, not

more than 4 members shall be of the same political party.
The Joint Committee or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof
would be authorized to hold such h earings, to sit and act at such places and
times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses
and the production of such books, papers and documents, to administer such
oath s, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and make
such expenditures as it deems advisable.

The Committee would be, in addition,

empowered to appoint its staff, which I would make mandatory that it be small,
highly selective, and with the highest possible clearance, and would be
authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the
d ep artm ents and establishments of the Gove rnment,
Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, the CIA is in somewhat the sam e
cat ego ry a s the Atomic Energy Commission; and just as a special c om mittee,
w i th well defined authority and powers has been created on a joint congressional
basis to oversee and supervise the interests of AEC, so I believe that a Joint
Congressional Committee should be created for the same purpose in connection
with the CIA.

I r ealize full well, because of the very nature of the duties of the

- 6 CIA, that there has been no public scrutiny of it s activities .

This may be

necessary in this day and age, but I believe that a Joint Congressional Committee should be created for the purpose of seeing that good management is
maintained in the CIA and also to keep a constant check o n its intelligence
po licies.

It is well, too , that this Joint Committee should be in a position to

criticize any mistakes which the CIA may make.
Until a committee of the kind this resolution proposes is established,
there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central Inte lligence
Ag ency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded.
The creation of the n ew executive board to r eview intelligence
fulfills partially the suggestion of the r ecent Hoover Commission report on
Intellige nce .

However, it is only a partial fulfillment of the Hoover Commis-

sion r ecommendations .

The Hoover Commission, on two occasions, suggested

a bi-partisan committee including members of both houses of Congress
"empowered by law" to ask and get whatever information it thought necessary to
aid , guide or restrain CIA.
Recommendation No. 2 of the recent Intelligence Activities r eport
of the Hoover Commission reads as follows:
"That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed
of members of both Houses of the Congress and other publicspirited citizens commanding the utmost national respec t and
confidence, be established by act of Congress to make
periodic surveys of the o rganization, functions, policies, and
results of the Government agencies handling foreign Intelligence operations; and to report, under adequate security
safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress, and to the President, annually and at such other
times as may be necessary or advisable. The proposed
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'watchdog 'commission should be em powered by law to
demand and r ece ive any information it neede d for its own
use. It would be patterned after the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
(Hoover Commission) . Appo intments by the President of
persons from private life to the proposed Commission
should be made from a select list of distinguished indi viduals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability ,
with records of unselfish service to th~ Nation . 11
Mr. Chairman. I wir.h to state agc..in that the appointment of the
citizens board should not preclude the establishment of a continuing and
pe r manent Congressional watchdog committee.

Such a committee would act as

a financial ove rs eer, sup:!rvisor, guardian, sponsor and defender of the CIA.
It coul d give a constant and more thorough supervision .to our inte lligence

activities than could any periodic check . Fo-r th e information of the committee,
(New Hampshire)
Senator Styles Bridges !nforms me that he voted ag:.1inst the cre ation of the
civilian advisory group, and it is hiq belid that Senator John McClellan
(Arkansas) joined him in this decision .

Both of them, however, as members

of the Hoover Commission, would r ecommend, according to Senator Bridges,
the establishm e nt of a Joint Congressional Committee for the CIA.
Two committees, the Joint Congressional Alomic Energy Committee
and the Joint Congressional Central Intelligence Committee, would be mutually
supporting .

They should insure as far as humanly possible, a proper support

for and control of, ou r powerful
committee cannot do alone.

intclligenc~

organizations .

This, a citize n s '
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I firmly believe that it is now more imperative than ever that a
Joint Congressional Committee be created at the ear li est opportunity.

The

Representatives of the people are the ones who should be given, through a
Joint Committee of Co ngress, the right to act fo r t he Congress vis-a-vis the
CIA, just as the J oint At0mic Energy Committee
has done for some yeare

vi

!': - a -vi s the

Atom~ c.

c!o~s .l.t

the present time and

:2nergy Commission .

